This first article presents the thoughts of Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian who wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War and is also cited as an intellectual forbearer of realpolitik.
Thucydides was an Athenian historian who also happened to serve as an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was then sent into exile, enabling him to travel freely among the Peloponnesian allies and to view the war from the perspective of both sides. During this time, he conducted research on the war, thinking it would be one of the greatest wars waged among the Greeks in terms of scale, then wrote a historical account of the war titled History of the Peloponnesian War.
For convenience, we will refer to the book as History from this point forward. History consists of eight books. The first book seeks to explain why the Peloponnesian War broke out, while the remainders books 2 through 8 focus on the war itself. They started out as a small group of city-states called the Delian League, formed as an anti-Persian alliance in the end of the Persian Wars between the Achaemenid Empire of Persia and the Hellenic city-states BC.
They grew stronger and their influence began to dominate other city-states, proceeding to conquer all of Greece except for Sparta and its allies, and became recognized as the Athenian Empire.
It ensured resentment toward the Athens. Friction between Athens and the Peloponnesian states, including Sparta, began after the departure of the Persians from Greece in the end of the Persian Wars. Sparta attempted to prevent the reconstruction of the walls of Athens, which protected Athens from land attack by the Sparta, but the attempt was rebuffed. Another friction flared up in BC, when a land of Helot ruled by Sparta revolted, the Spartans summoned forces from all of their allies, including Athens, to help them suppress the revolt.
The offended Athenians repudiated their alliance with Sparta, and when the surrendering Helots had been permitted to evacuate the country, the Athenians settled them at the strategic city of Naupactus on the Corinthian Gulf. As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists the scholars who, especially in the s, tried to reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science. Nevertheless, in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature 4.
He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a useful tool of foreign policy. This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians.
Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics. Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.
In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power.
Insofar as power, or interest defined as power, is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration. Rational state actors pursue their national interests.
Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise based solely on satisfaction of their mutual interests.
Although he defines politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the Machiavellian route of completely removing ethics from politics. He suggests that, although human beings are political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral animals. Deprived of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or sub-humans. Even if it is not guided by universal moral principles, political action thus has for Morgenthau a moral significance.
Ultimately directed toward the objective of national survival, it also involves prudence. Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism.
International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise.
Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by education.
Morgenthau himself reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality. But he defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility, i. Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can result in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing benefits.
Hence, rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and the rationality of this pursuit, and sets it up as a norm. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international politics in the way Morgenthau claims.
It does not allow us to understand the actions of states independently from the motives and ideological preferences of their political leaders. It cannot serve as the basis for defining politics as an autonomous sphere.
Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to power, security or national interest. International politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical and cultural context. Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations, their realism can also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them, rather than by moralizing.
However, political theory realism and international relations realism seem like two separate research programs. Duncan Bell , those who contribute to realism in political theory give little attention to those who work on realism in international politics.
At the same time, there was an attempt to develop a more methodologically rigorous approach to theorizing about international affairs. This in turn provoked a counterattack by Morgenthau and scholars associated with the so-called English School, especially Hedley Bull, who defended a traditional approach Bull As a result, the IR discipline has been divided into two main strands: traditional or non-positivist and scientific or positivist neo-positivist.
At a later stage the third strand: post-positivism has been added. The traditionalists raise normative questions and engage with history, philosophy and law. The scientists or positivists stress a descriptive and explanatory form of inquiry, rather than a normative one.
They have established a strong presence in the field. Already by the mids, the majority of American students in international relations were trained in quantitative research, game theory, and other new research techniques of the social sciences. This, along with the changing international environment, had a significant effect on the discipline. The realist assumption was that the state is the key actor in international politics, and that relations among states are the core of actual international relations.
However, with the receding of the Cold War during the s, one could witness the growing importance of international and non-governmental organizations, as well as of multinational corporations. This development led to a revival of idealist thinking, which became known as neoliberalism or pluralism.
While accepting some basic assumptions of realism, the leading pluralists, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to describe this more sophisticated picture of global politics. They would argue that there can be progress in international relations and that the future does not need to look like the past. The realist response came most prominently from Kenneth N.
Waltz, who reformulated realism in international relations in a new and distinctive way. In his book Theory of International Politics , first published in , he responded to the liberal challenge and attempted to cure the defects of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which has became known as structural realism or neorealism.
Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to avoid any philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to build a theory of international politics analogous to microeconomics.
He argues that states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy and have the same fundamental interest: to survive. Waltz maintains that by paying attention to the individual state, and to ideological, moral and economic issues, both traditional liberals and classical realists make the same mistake. They fail to develop a serious account of the international system—one that can be abstracted from the wider socio-political domain.
Waltz acknowledges that such an abstraction distorts reality and omits many of the factors that were important for classical realism. It does not allow for the analysis of the development of specific foreign policies.
However, it also has utility. Notably, it assists in understanding the primary determinants of international politics. It cannot serve to develop policies of states concerning their international or domestic affairs. His theory helps only to explain why states behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government and diverse political ideologies, and why, despite their growing interdependence, the overall picture of international relations is unlikely to change.
According to Waltz, the uniform behavior of states over centuries can be explained by the constraints on their behavior that are imposed by the structure of the international system. Anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international system.
The units of the international system are states. Waltz recognizes the existence of non-state actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant. Since all states want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which each state has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among them.
While functionally similar, they are nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities the power each of them represents to perform the same function.
Consequently, Waltz sees power and state behavior in a different way from the classical realists. For Morgenthau power was both a means and an end, and rational state behavior was understood as simply the course of action that would accumulate the most power. In contrast, neorealists assume that the fundamental interest of each state is security and would therefore concentrate on the distribution of power.
What also sets neorealism apart from classical realism is methodological rigor and scientific self-conception Guzinni , — Waltz insists on empirical testability of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological ideal, which, as he himself admits, can have only a limited application in international relations.
The distribution of capabilities among states can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle of international relations, remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the behavior of states that become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying to refute neoliberal ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons why the anarchic international system limits cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains.
In the context of anarchy, each state is uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and thus lead it to dependence on others. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest. Because of its theoretical elegance and methodological rigor, neorealism has become very influential within the discipline of international relations. However, while initially gaining more acceptance than classical realism, neorealism has also provoked strong critiques on a number of fronts.
In Waltz wrote that in the nuclear age the international bipolar system, based on two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but likely to persist —7. The bipolar world turned out to have been more precarious than most realist analysts had supposed. Its end opened new possibilities and challenges related to globalization.
This has led many critics to argue that neorealism, like classical realism, cannot adequately account for changes in world politics. The new debate between international neo realists and neo liberals is no longer concerned with the questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system rather than by institutions, learning and other factors that are conductive to cooperation.
However, by employing game theory he shows that states can widen the perception of their self-interest through economic cooperation and involvement in international institutions. Patterns of interdependence can thus affect world politics. Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to deal better with factors affecting state interaction, and with change.
Critical theorists, such as Robert W. Cox, also focus on the alleged inability of neorealism to deal with change. In their view, neorealists take a particular, historically determined state-based structure of international relations and assume it to be universally valid.
In contrast, critical theorists believe that by analyzing the interplay of ideas, material factors, and social forces, one can understand how this structure has come about, and how it may eventually change. They contend that neorealism ignores both the historical process during which identities and interests are formed, and the diverse methodological possibilities.
It legitimates the existing status quo of strategic relations among states and considers the scientific method as the only way of obtaining knowledge. The effect assigned to society is the only point where Hobbes and Thucydides decidedly disagree not only from Realism but also from each other. Hobbes, on the contrary, points to the state-level as presenting a practical constraint on state-behaviour which is mostly not taken into account by Realists.
While the impacts of these differences should not be neglected, one finds a surprisingly strong correlation between the views of the philosopher and the ancient scholar on the origins of state behaviour.
Kegley, Jr. Williams, Op. Cit; Michael W. Gaskin ed. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing. E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view.
Any amount, in any currency, is appreciated. Many thanks! Translated [from the Greek] by Rex Warner; Penguin Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing. E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view. Any amount, in any currency, is appreciated.
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